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In this paper experimental data from three Swedish demonstration programmes 
in 2004 are used to study pre-programme effects of active placement efforts. In 
one of the experiments, targeted towards a broad group of UI receivers, 
arranged job-search activities in groups combined with increased monitoring of 
job-search efforts generated a 46 per cent increase in the escape rate between 
referral to and start of the programme services. This translates into a two-week 
reduction of the ongoing UI spell. Referrals to increased monitoring alone did 
not have the same effect on exit behaviour. In the other two experiments, 
targeted towards youth and highly educated respectively, referrals to active 
placement efforts had no effect on the pre-programme outflow. 
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 1 Introduction 
Typically, the impact on labour market participation is the parameter of interest 
in studying the effects of various active measures on the unemployed. 
However, by acknowledging behavioural adjustments before commencement, 
further aspects of the potential benefits of labour market policies are captured. 
Pre-programme effects are the result of an increased job-search effort or a 
lower reservation wage between notification of the programme and planned 
programme start. They are therefore also referred to as "motivation effects”. 
Besides activating the unemployed and upgrading their skills, active labour 
market policies decrease the utility of unemployment by reducing the amount 
of “leisure time”. A common perception among employment officers is that 
referrals to different types of compulsory programme activities help to remove 
those having little problem finding employment, thus reducing the extent of 
moral hazard behaviour. This is confirmed in empirical studies where positive 
effects before actual treatment have been found in both typical placement 
efforts, i.e. job-search assistance activities and recurrent follow-up meetings, 
and in labour market programmes.  
Evaluating experimental data from the Worker Profiling and Reemployment 
Services in Kentucky, Black et al. (2003) ascribe a large part of the 2.2 weeks 
reduction in benefit receipt in the treatment group to exits coinciding with 
notification of re-employment services (job-search training and preparation 
courses). In the Maryland UI Work Search Demonstration experiments (1997), 
a short job-search training course reduced the average duration of UI payments 
by five per cent. The effect was largely generated by an increased hazard rate 
in the period immediately preceding scheme start. In the U.K., Dolton & 
O’Neill (1996) assessed the “negative threat component” from compulsory 
interviews after six months of unemployment in the Restart programme. Using 
experimental data, they found a significant increase in the off-unemployment 
hazard rate prior to attending a Restart interview.  
On non-experimental data, a study from Australia (DEWRSB, 2001) found 
large “compliance effects” (around 10 percentage points) from referrals to a 
three-week job-search training programme. Rosholm & Svarer (2004), on 
Danish data, include a measure of the risk of programme participation as an 
explanatory variable in estimations of the off-unemployment hazard rates. They 
conclude that the perceived risk of future programmes decreases the average 
unemployment duration by three weeks. Carling & Larsson (2005), find a 
 
 
1 slightly increased exit rate to employment before the start of a Swedish youth 
measure introduced in the late 1990s. Finally, Jensen et al. (2003) failed to 
establish a similar enhanced exit rate preceding a Danish youth unemployment 
reform implemented in 1996.
1  
This study uses experimental data from three demonstration programmes in 
Sweden in 2004, where alternative placement activities at the public 
employment offices were tested against the regular services.
2 The design of the 
experiments explicitly allows for the examination of exit behaviour between 
the time of being notified of the programme and programme start. The pre-
programme effects are identified as the difference in the escape rate from 
unemployment and the receipt of UI benefits between the experiment group 
offered the scheme services and the control group offered the regular services. 
The subsequent propensity of unemployment is also studied among those 
leaving unemployment in the pre-programme period.  
The results are mixed. I find evidence of increased off-unemployment 
hazard rates in the pre-programme period in one of the three demonstration 
programmes offering a combination of compulsory job-search assistance 
activities and increased monitoring of the job-search efforts. By randomly 
assigning two groups to different services, I conclude that the positive effect 
derives from the referrals to job-search assistance activities. Referrals to merely 
increased job-search monitoring do not have the same positive effect on the 
exit rate. A possible explanation is that the job-search assistance activities were 
arranged in groups whereas the monitoring consisted of in-person interviews. 
The estimated 46 per cent increase in exit rate corresponds to a two-week 
reduction of the ongoing UI spells. The analysis shows that the positive effect 
is not the result of more temporary interruptions of the unemployment spells 
due to, for instance, less attractive job matches.  
The remainder of this paper is structured in the following manner: 
Section 2 offers a theoretical framework for considering pre-programme 
effects while Section 3 briefly presents the background, the programme 
                                                      
1 Motivation effects are also confirmed in studies of the exit rate from unemployment close to UI 
benefit exhaustion in UI systems applying “soft” UI-duration constraints where participation in 
programmes qualifies for additional days of compensation (see Carling et al., 1996, Thoursie, 
1998, and Roed et al., 2002, on Swedish data, and Lalive et al., 2000, on Swiss data). The 
increased exit pattern on approaching benefit exhaustion found in these studies should, with 





2 In Sweden, only two social experiments have been reported in this field (Delander, 1978, and 
Hägglund 2006). services, and the enrolment procedure of each experiment. Section 4 
presents data and outlines the empirical strategy, and Section 5 reports 
mean-difference comparisons as well as hazard rate estimations of the 
pre-programme outflow. The number of weeks of unemployment in the 
26 weeks subsequent to UI spell interruption is also presented. Section 6 
sums up and offers some interpretations of the results. 
2 Theoretical  framework 
In a standard job-search framework individuals choose between income and 
leisure so as to maximise the present value of expected utility. The present 
value of unemployment increases with the number of insured days remaining in 
the benefit period. As benefit approaches exhaustion, the declined value of 
unemployment is reflected in a lower reservation wage causing a rise in the 
escape rate out of unemployment (see Mortensen, 1977).  
Introducing the possibility of being referred to active placement efforts, 
similar to those offered in the demonstrations, the expected utility from 
programme participation must also be considered (for example, see Carling et 
al. (1996), or Black et al. (2003)). First of all, participation is to various degrees 
expected to be time consuming and to reduce both leisure time and time for job 
search. This has a negative effect on the value of unemployment. For some 
unemployed, other aspects of participation, for instance activities in groups, 
also might reduce the utility of unemployment during the services. If the 
claimants anticipate those activities, the value of unemployment falls prior to 
programme start.  
Second, job seekers might also anticipate benefits from participating in 
active placement efforts. If the services are effective, they would be expected to 
improve future job chances and/or the distribution of wage offers during and 
after receiving the services. This would increase the utility of being 
unemployed before start. If, on the other hand, the services are expected to 
have a negative impact on future job chances and wages, the opposite holds. 
The expected effect of programme referrals on the escape rate from 
unemployment prior to start thus largely depends on the expected effectiveness 
of the programme. If expectations are positive and the effect overshadows the 
negative aspects of participation, the net effect on the value of unemployment 
is positive and the exit rate slows down. If expectations are negative, at least 
 
 
3 for some of those referred to the programme, we would expect an increased 
exit rate prior to start. 
Finally, the lower value of unemployment could also affect job turnover and 
future risk of unemployment if the programme referral caused the job seekers 
to accept less qualitative job matches. 
3 The  experiments
3 
In 2004, the Swedish Labour Market Board (SLMB) granted funds for several 
demonstration programmes to be conducted at local employment offices with 
the purpose of testing alternative modes of carrying out placement activities. 
Placement activities here comprise job-search assistance, interviews, in-depth 
counselling, monitoring of job-search efforts, and employer contacts. The 
county labour boards were invited to apply for funding if they could present a 
strategy for improved matching. Rather than new innovative methods of 
matching, these strategies typically involved higher quality delivery of already 
existing services. The activities could either be tested on broad groups of 
unemployed or be targeted towards some particularly difficult group.
4  
The official document commissioning the county labour board to execute 
the activities agreed upon, in some cases specified criteria for the selection 
process. In accordance with the experimental design, participants and non-
participants would be selected through randomisation. Also, the control group 
was supposed to be assigned the employment offices’ regular services.   
The SLMB appointed an evaluator from within its own ranks, responsible 
for conducting the experiments.
5  The evaluator’s job was to design the 
experiment and to protect the integrity of the experimental design throughout 
the evaluation period. The evaluator was also in charge of continuously 
performing randomisation on new experiment and control group members to 
replace those leaving unemployment for jobs etc. In common for the 
experiments presented in this paper is that a pre-specified routine with fixed 
intervals between notification of the programme and programme start preceded 
                                                      
3 For a more extensive presentation of the experiments, the reader is referred to Hägglund 
(2006b). 
4 The programme activities were carried out by project teams at the employment offices. Each 




5 The author of this paper was, as currently employed at the SLMB, responsible for conducting 
the three experiments presented in this paper. the enrolment of job seekers. This is a pre-requisite in order to be able to 
discriminate between behavioural responses to being notified of the programme 
and participation itself. The scheme services were compulsory, which means 
that rejecting a referral caused a reduction in UI compensation.
6  
The enrolment routines and the interval lengths, briefly presented below, 
differed both between, and within, the demonstrations. However, all 
demonstrations performed repeated enrolments of new participants throughout 
the active phase of the experiments. The referrals briefly introduced the job 
seekers to the objectives and the general working methods of the 
demonstrations. Those receiving UI benefits were also reminded of their 
obligations as UI receivers and the penalties involved in violating them. 
Finally, the sample sizes were restricted due to capacity constraints, i.e., as a 
result of the number of coaches and the intensity of the services in each 
scheme.
7
3.1  The Jämtland demonstration 
The purpose of the Jämtland demonstration was to test new methods of 
increasing search activity among the unemployed. The average search activity 
among the unemployed in Jämtland was low. In fact, in a monthly survey 
among currently unemployed and programme participants performed by the 
Swedish Labour Market Board (the Job-seekers survey), Jämtland had reported 
the largest proportion of non-active job seekers in two of the last three years. 
The programme activities were targeted towards the openly unemployed who 
were “match ready” and eligible for UI compensation. The experiment group 
was randomly divided into two separate groups. The first group (the JSA 
group) received both assisted job-search and increased job-search monitoring 
in monthly group meetings. The other group (the increased job-search 
monitoring group, or the no-JSA group) was only subject to increased job-
search monitoring treatment which involved monthly in-person interviews. 
This design enables the effects of being referred to JSA and those of increased 
                                                      
6 UI-recipients are obligated to pursue the referrals suggested by the case workers both to jobs 
and to programmes. The employment offices are responsible for following up on referrals and 
must report UI eligible job seekers who violate the basic conditions for compensation to the UI 
Funds. The UI Funds then make the decisions about whether or not the negligence should 
render withdrawal of benefits. Rejecting a referral leads to a gradual reduction of compensation. 
The first time the claimants refuse an offer they risk a 25 per cent cutback for eight benefit 
weeks. A second refusal in the same benefit period reduces compensation by 50 per cent for an 




7 The policy documents specified a requirement of at least 300 experiment group members. job-search monitoring to be identified separately. The programme was time-
limited (3 months), and participation in practice involved 4–5 meetings at the 
employment office. 
The scheme services were carried out between February and November, 
2004, and involved 611 experiment group members (311 receiving both 
treatments and 300 subject only to increased monitoring), along with another 
642 control group members. Of these, 496 (246 +250) and 507 respectively 
collected UI benefits the week of the referrals and are therefore included in the 
main sample. Enrolment of participants was carried out in Februari, April, and 
August/September. The enrolment routine consisted of two steps. In the first 
step, those selected to participate were referred to an individual meeting after 
two weeks where an initial assessment was performed. The participants were 
also informed that their next meeting, which either was a JSA-group meeting or 
an individual job-search monitoring meeting, would take place three or five 
weeks later. A second referral confirmed this. An on average 6.3-week interval 
was applied between the job seeker first being notified and programme start.
8  
Table 1 , columns 1-3, describes some characteristics of the 
experiment and control groups using data from the unemployment 
register (Händel), and the UI payment register (A-stat), both presented in 
more detail in the next section.
9  Of the three demonstrations, the 
Jämtland demonstration is the least targeted one, with representation in 
all age groups and educational level categories. The average job seeker 
had been registered at the employment office for approximately five 
years, whereof one year in the ongoing unemployment period.
10,11
                                                      
8 In the first enrolment in February, there was a five-week interval between notification and start 
of the programme. The following enrolments applied a seven-week interval. After the first 
meeting the experiment group members received “extra surveillance” in the public employment 
service internal information system, which, in practice, meant they on average received more job 
suggestions and job referrals. In the result section, however, I argue that this is not likely to have 
had any influential impact on the outcome. 
9 More experiment and control group statistics are reported in Hägglund (2006a). 




11 Compared to the control group, the JSA-experiment group has a significantly more extensive 
history of employment office registration, especially as openly unemployed. Note that the 
experiment and control groups are expected to differ significantly in some aspects (0.05 • the no. 
of covariates). 3.2  The Uppsala demonstration 
The motivation of this programme was a growing number of long-term 
unemployed among persons with post upper secondary education. Since the 
situation was particularly alarming among those specialised in social science, 
the demonstration programme was targeted towards this group. Besides openly 
unemployed, 17 per cent of the sample contained currently part-time employed. 
Activities primarily consisted of frequent non-supervised workshops in groups 
of 8–10 persons. The experiment comprised a total of 1092 (517) job seekers 
(UI eligible), where 549 (275) were offered the demonstration services and 543 
(242) were directed to the regular services.   
Enrolments took place in February, May, September and November of 
2004. First being informed of and introduced to the services in a letter or by e-
mail, the job seekers were asked to update the coaches on any recent 
educational achievements and new work experience. A second notification was 
sent out as a reminder of the start date. The interval between first being notified 
and programme start was gradually reduced from initially six to two weeks in 
the last enrolment. On average, the length of the pre-programme period was 4.4 
weeks. According to Table 1 (columns 4 and 5), the vast majority of the 
targeted population was between age 25 and 44. Also, in contrast to the other 
demonstrations, the majority of the job seekers were women. 
3.3  The Östergötland demonstration 
The labour market in 2003 was troublesome for youth. In the fall, the Swedish 
government proclaimed that measures were to be taken at employment offices 
to cut long-term unemployment in this group by 50 per cent within one year. 
The situation was particularly difficult in Östergötland, a region where youth 
were especially exposed to major lay offs, and where they also had the most 
difficult time finding new jobs. The programme in Östergötland proceeded in 
parallel with the nationwide goal of halving the number of young long-term 
unemployed. This is important when interpreting the results, as the service 
level in the control group would be expected to exceed the “normal” service 
level for youth in that region. The idea of the demonstration, which among 
unemployed youth focused primarily on the UI eligible, was to intensify the 
case worker/job seeker contacts through weekly meetings in job-search clubs. 




7 The experiment and control groups were gradually filled up with two 
enrolments every month between March and October (July and August 
excepted). A total of 487 (357) job seekers registered as openly unemployed 
(UI eligible) were singled out for participation, whereas another 504 (379) were 
controls. The referrals were sent out three weeks before the week of the first 
group meeting.  
In Table 1, the young target population is reflected in a low age average, a 
relatively low educational level, a brief unemployment history and low UI 












Table 1 Summary statistics for the experimental and control groups. Bold type indicates statistical significance at 
the 5%-level. 
  Jämtland scheme  Uppsala scheme  Östergötland scheme 
 Exp. 
group       
(JSA)    
Exp. 
group      
(No JSA) 
Control 
group       
Exp. 
group     
Control 
group      
Exp. 
group     
Control 
group       
  Female  0.32 0.35 0.28 0.53 0.50 0.44 0.38
Age 
  18-24  0.07 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.91 0.92
  25-34  0.30 0.28 0.32 0.44 0.46 0.09 0.08
  35-44  0.27 0.23 0.24 0.29 0.24 - -
  45-54  0.18 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.19 - -
  55-  0.17 0.22 0.16 0.06 0.11 - -
Mean  40.33 41.46 40.25 37.56 38.57 22.71 22.55
Educational level 
  <=Compulsory school 0.19 0.24 0.20 - - 0.09 0.13
  Upper secondary 0.54 0.49 0.54 - - 0.83 0.78
  University   0.27 0.25 0.25 1.0 1.0 0.08 0.08
Experience in desired profession (yes) 0.85 0.80 0.84 0.72 0.76 0.81 0.77
Education in desired profession (yes) 0.75 0.69 0.74 0.91 0.90 0.58 0.54 
 
10 
Citizenship (Swedish) 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.95 0.93 0.96 0.97
Unemployment experience
  No. of programmes 4.25 3.54 3.68 1.72 1.62 1.46 1.41
  In ongoing unemployment period, years 1.07 0.99 0.95 0.60 0.66 0.56 0.55
  In all unemployment periods, years 5.86 4.71 4.84 3.07 3.08 1.73 1.82
UI compensation
 
  Income-based daily salary (SEK) 864 879 875 844 804 501 484
  Daily compensation (SEK) 624 616 626 589 569 486 481
Number of observations 246 250 507 275 242 357 379
Notes: Data are based on information from the week of notification. Table 2 The demonstration programmes: an overview. 
 Jämtland  Uppsala  Östergötland 
Target group  Openly 
unemployed, 
eligible for UI 
Openly 
unemployed/part-time 
workers & post 




Type of services  1. Arranged job-
search activities in 





search workshops & job 
acquisition 
Arranged job-search 
activities in groups 








1253/1003 1092/517  991/736 
- Experiment group     
(All/UI eligible)  611/496 549/275  487/357 
- Control group     
(All/UI eligible)  642/507 543/242  504/379 
4  Data and empirical strategy 
4.1 Data 
I use UI-payment register data (A-stat) to follow the spells of unemployment. 
A-stat, administered by the UI Funds, contains weekly data on the number of 
UI-compensated days, type of UI benefit and benefit level for all unemployed 
who are entitled for UI benefits since January 1, 1999. Data also include 
information on payment decisions, previous income and remaining days of 
benefits. Using A-stat, the analysis is narrowed to those qualified for UI 
benefits. Since A-stat lacks information on disruption cause, it is linked to the 
unemployment register (Händel) and the event-specific information at the 
disruption date. From Händel  I also have access to individual-specific 
 
 
11 information on gender, age, educational level, citizenship, working disability, 
desired profession, education for and experience in desired profession, and 
unemployment history.
12
4.2 Empirical  strategy 
Each demonstration programme is studied separately. UI claimants receiving a 
full week of compensation in the week of notification are followed until the 
week of the programme start, unless the UI spell is disrupted before start.
13 
Matching A-stat and Händel data to obtain a disruption cause, a two-week lag 
is applied in which the disruption date from A-stat and the date of the registered 
event in Händel is allowed to deviate. Where the deviation is larger than two 
weeks, a constructed event (“cause unknown”) is assigned to the job seeker.   
I report mean differences in UI-disruption incidence in the pre-programme 
period due to various exit causes. The analysis thus not considers jobs acquired 
during the pre-programme period but with start dates outside the range of the 
evaluation period. A disruption is defined as anything between very temporary 
intermissions of 0.5 days to permanent exit.
14,15  
An important feature of the design of these experiments is the possibility for 
control group members to receive regular services. This is a consequence of the 
experiments originally being designed to assess the effectiveness of the tested 
services compared with the regular services.
16 To account for the flow into 
regular programmes and the subsequent expected reduced possibility of active 
                                                      
12 Most research on unemployment duration in Sweden has utilised the longitudinal data in 
Händel. However, a drawback with Händel is the heavy reliance on self-reported information. 
For instance, job seekers who find jobs or leave the work force sometimes omit to inform the 
employment office. Data therefore risk to overestimate the length of the unemployment spells. 
Similar to Händel, A-stat relies on self-reported information. However, rather than notifying the 
employment office, UI-eligible job seekers leaving unemployment simply quit sending in their 
applications for UI compensation. More importantly, falsely reporting to the UI fund could lead 
to prosecution. A-stat should thus be more reliable than Händel. For a more detailed discussion 
about the flaws in the unemployment register, and its importance on the results of this study, 
see Hägglund (2006a). 
13 The start week is included in the evaluation period. 
14 An exception is made for the part-time employed in Uppsala, for whom a one-week disruption 
limit applies. 
15 Note that by accounting for very short interruptions, disruptions of the UI spell is not 
necessarily equivalent to not participating in the demonstration services. 
16 Thus, rather than the mean impact of referral compared with no referral (“the mean-effect-of-
referral”), the outcome difference provides an estimate of the marginal effect of referrals to the 
tested services compared to a “normal” dose of referrals to the regular services. However, with 
the very short evaluation periods, the vast majority of the control group members are not referred 
to any services at all. 
 
 
12job search, I estimate a Cox proportional hazard model.
17 The hazard is defined 
as the conditional probability of leaving unemployment at time t, given that the 
person is still unemployed at t. Unemployment spells ongoing at the end of the 
evaluation period, or ended before due to start of a labour market programme, 
are treated as right censored observations. This means that their time T is set to 
the time until the end of the evaluation period or until starting a regular 
programme respectively. In the remaining cases, T refers to a completed (non-
censored) unemployment period where transitions to jobs or out of the 
workforce are jointly examined. The hazard,  , at time t  for job seeker i 
is:  
) t ( θi
 
       (1)  ) t ( θ ) β ´ x exp( ) x | t ( θ i i i 0 =
 
where   is the unrestricted baseline hazard,  is a covariate vector, and   
is the corresponding parameter vector. The explanatory variables have a 
constant proportional effect on the hazard. Note that the explanatory variables 
adjust for random heterogeneity in observables. I report the effects both 
including and excluding the explanatory variables. 
) t ( θ0 i x β
5 Results 
5.1 Mean  differences 
Table 3 reports pre-programme effects as mean differences in exits to both 
known and unknown destinations. UI disruptions without a corresponding 
disruption cause are referred to as exits to “unknown destinations”. The exact 
exit deviations to the various disruption causes should be interpreted with some 
care since they are most likely sensitive to the higher case-worker/job-seeker 
intensity in the demonstration services, which reduces the risk of incorrect 
coding. Of main focus is instead the sum of all disruptions. 
In the Jämtland demonstration, a large positive difference in total exits is 
reported. The 8.7 percentage point’s deviation is statistically significant at the 
one per cent significance level, and corresponds to an effect of 23 per cent in 
disruption intensity. The experiment group has a somewhat higher exit rate to 
                                                      
17 See Lancaster (1990) for a theoretical presentation. 
 
 
13 both known and unknown exit causes. The significant difference in exits to 
“other known destinations” is the result of relatively more people reporting 
temporary job-search interruptions. The groups display almost similar portions 
of exits to regular programmes, which imply that the positive effect is not the 
result of more frequent exits to regular programmes in the control group. 
An interesting result is that practically the entire positive effect in the 
Jämtland demonstration stems from the subgroup that, besides increased 
monitoring, was referred to job-search assistance activities. The exit deviation 
suggests a large and highly significant positive pre-programme effect of 14.2 
percentage points, or 37.5 per cent. The differences in exits to jobs and to 
“unknown destinations” are both significant. The effect of being assigned only 
the increased monitoring is small but slightly positive (3.3 percentage points). 
It thus seems that being referred to job-search activities in groups is considered 
a far less attractive alternative than being referred to continuous individual 
follow-up meetings.  
Similar to Jämtland, the Uppsala demonstration reports a similar portion of 
job seekers leaving open unemployment for programme participation in the 
pre-programme period. Also, the experiment and control groups significantly 
deviate in the reported job-exit frequency. However, since there is a negative 
significant deviation in the exit frequency to “unknown destinations”, there is a 
considerable risk that the positive effect is due to information asymmetries and 
the scheme case workers´ better possibility of keeping track of job seekers. In 
total, a small and insignificant negative effect is found on the disruption 
intensity.  
In Östergötland, the proportion of control group members initiating a 
regular programme during the study period significantly outweighs the 
corresponding portion in the experiment group (-6.1 percentage points). 
This reflects the focus at this time on the subgroup of unemployed youth 
and that the demonstration services here, more than in the other 
demonstration programmes, were an alternative to other active measures. 
Work-practice schemes, the Youth Guarantee and preparatory training 
courses dominated these measures.
18 There are, ex ante, no reasons to 
assume that these measures would have a systematically different impact 
                                                      
18 The Youth Guarantee is a programme where the municipalities sign agreements to offer full-
time activities to long-term unemployed youth. Carling & Larsson (2005) conclude that these 
activities involve very much the same distribution of labour market programmes offered youth at 
the regular employment offices, i.e., mainly work-practice schemes and training programmes. 
 
 
14on pre-programme exits compared to the experiment group activities. 
However, due to the difference in programme intensity, a direct 
comparison of the transitions to jobs and other exits would not be as 
relevant. Despite the possible effect on exits to “other known 
destinations”, the total share of disrupted UI spells is almost identical 
between the groups. In column 5, only a very small positive pre-
programme effect on the disruption intensity is reported. 
 
 
Table 3 Pre-programme effects, mean differences (standard errors are within 
parentheses). 
 Jämtland  Uppsala  Östergöt-
land 
 All  JSA No  JSA    
Non-
censored: 


















































Censored:       
Regular 
programmes






















Note: No. of observations, Jämtland (All): 1003, Jämtland (JSA): 753, Jämtland (No JSA): 757, Uppsala: 
517, Östergötland: 736. : 
a) Also includes part-time jobs. 
b) Includes exits due to retirement, regular studies 
and temporary job-search interruptions. 
c) Includes exits with a registered event “reason unknown” in Händel, 
and exits lacking an event within 14 days from the UI disruption date. 
d) Includes exits to for instance labour 





15 5.2  Proportional hazard model estimation 
This section reports the pre-programme effects on the off-UI receipt hazard rate 
where exits to regular programmes are censored. Both the non-adjusted results 
and the results adjusted for randomly arisen heterogeneity in observables are 
presented in Table 4.  
First of all, in correspondence with the results from Table 3, referrals to the 
services in the Jämtland demonstration generate a positive significant effect on 
the outflow from unemployment before programme start. The non-adjusted 
point estimate reports a statistically significant 31.5 per cent increased exit rate 
as a result of being referred to the services. The reported adjusted impact (29.6 
%) is somewhat smaller but still significant.
19 The non-adjusted estimations 
report a large (55.1 %) positive and significant effect from referrals to the 
combination of services (JSA), and a smaller (10.7 %) positive but insignificant 
effect from referrals to only the increased monitoring, or the no-JSA, services. 
Adjustment generates a somewhat smaller JSA point estimate, 46.1 per cent, 
and a slightly larger no-JSA impact estimate of 12.7 per cent.
20,
21  
The non-adjusted impact estimate from being referred to the Uppsala 
demonstration services is practically zero (-0.5 %). Controlling for random 
differences in observable characteristics, the impact estimate is adjusted 
upwards (3.0 %) but is still insignificant.  
The results from the pre-programme effect estimations in the Östergötland 
demonstration provide no evidence of any behavioural adjustments. Both the 
adjusted and non-adjusted impact estimates are close to zero. The results could 
possibly be explained by the relatively short (3 weeks) pre-programme interval. 
However, as it turned out, many control group members faced a considerable 
                                                      
19 The larger standard errors are due to the loss of statistical degrees of freedom. 
20 Comparing the two treatments, the difference in outcomes corresponds to p-values of 0.13 
(non-adjusted), and 0.097 (adjusted).  
21 Analysing the weekly hazards in the pre-programme period shows that the positive pre-
programme effect in the JSA-group is rather constant throughout the pre-programme period 
(Hägglund 2006a). This suggests that pre-programme effects can occur also in situations where 
the pre-programme interval is relatively short. It also indicates that the extra surveillance in 
terms of more frequent job suggestions and job referrals among the experiment group members 
in the last weeks of the pre-programme period (footnote 7), are not likely to have affected the 
outcome. Had that been the case we would have expected an increasing pre-programme effect. 
Another strong argument in favour of the reported results is the significant outcome deviation 
between the experiment groups. Since both these groups received the extra surveillance, the 
difference must derive from the different services referred to.  
 
 
16chance/risk of being referred to regular activities in the near future, which 
diminished the “treatment dose” between the groups. 
Robustness of the results has been tested in two respects. First of all, by 
modifying the two-week requirement in finding an exit cause from the 
unemployment register, the relative exits to programmes and other destinations 
could be altered, which in turn could affect the results.
22 However, performing 
analyses on 1, 3 and 4-week requirements only have negligible effects on the 
impact estimates. Second, by limiting the analyses to UI receivers with at least 
20 days remaining in the current benefit period, only small changes of the 
impact estimates are found.
23
 
Table 4 Pre-programme effects on the hazard rate, 
non-adjusted and adjusted (standard errors are within 
parentheses) 
 Jämtland  Uppsala  Östergöt-
land 


























Note: No. of observations, Jämtland (All): 1003, Jämtland (JSA): 753, 
Jämtland (No JSA): 757, Uppsala: 517, Östergötland: 736. *, **, *** refer to 
significance at 10, 5 and 1 per cent levels respectively.  
 
5.3  The flow back to unemployment 
To appreciate the importance of pre-programme effects on UI savings, the 
persistence of the pre-programme outflow must be analysed. For instance, if a 
                                                      
22 If, for some reason, programme participation were systematically registered with a larger delay 
in the experiment group, a three- or four-week (instead of a two-week) requirement would reduce 
the number of exits accounted for in the analyses. This would thus have a negative effect on the 
impact estimate. 
23 Job seekers close to benefit exhaustion either received 300 fresh days of UI compensation, in 
which case they remained in the demonstration programme, or a referral to the Activity 
Guarantee, in which case they were coded as programme participants.  
 
 
17 positive effect on the exits before start is the result of very temporary 
interruptions, the programme would only have generated minor total savings in 
the UI system. 
Analysing the flow back to unemployment, outcome differences between 
the experiment and control groups do not necessarily provide a causal 
interpretation. This is because the groups compared in each experiment need 
not be comparable.
24 The analysis thus only describes the reoccurrence of 
unemployment among the subsets of experiment and control group members 
with disrupted UI spells. 
Table 5 reports the number of unemployed weeks in the 26 weeks after 
interruption of the UI spell among experiment and control group members 
leaving unemployment in the pre-programme period. Unemployed weeks here 
include both periods of open unemployment, where UI benefits are collected, 
and spells of regular programme participation, where the job seeker instead 
receives activity support.
25  
Overall, the risk of returning to unemployment is high. Only 25–30 per cent 
has no reported days of unemployment in the 26-week period. In the different 
experiments, on average 10–12 weeks were spent either as openly unemployed 
or as regular programme participants. Generally, the experiment groups report 
somewhat more unemployed weeks, although the differences (0.1–1.6 weeks) 
are not significant. The differences are also small studying openly unemployed 
spells and regular programme spells separately. 
Among those with disrupted UI spells in Jämtland, the difference in sub-
sequent unemployment is higher among those offered only the increased 
monitoring (+1.6 weeks) compared to those offered also the JSA-services (+0.5 
weeks). The positive effect on the pre-programme outflow among the latter 
thus not seems to be the result of a larger amount of short-term interruptions of 
the UI spell, for instance due to reporting sick the first day of the programme or 
accepting more temporary jobs. The same does not necessarily hold for the no-
JSA group combining an insignificant 12 per cent increased exit rate before 
programme start (Table 4) with a similarly insignificant 1.6-week increase in 
number of unemployed weeks in the following 26 weeks. 
                                                      
24 For instance, if the experiment group members are found on average to be more likely to return 
to unemployment, this could either be due to the referrals having a negative effect on the job 
matches, or due to the relatively worse job matches being realised earlier because of the 
programme referrals. 
25 Compensation during regular programmes (activity support) and open unemployment is the 
same for UI eligible job seekers.  
 
 
18Both Uppsala and Östergötland report very small deviations in 
unemployment between experiment and control group members. Interesting to 
note is that although starting a regular programme was a significantly more 
common pre-programme exit cause among the control group members in 
Östergötland, the average number of weeks in regular programmes after 26 
weeks is almost similar. Apparently, taking part in the experiment services only 
seems to have postponed participation in a regular programme. 
5.4  The pre-programme effects into perspective 
To put the impact estimates of the Jämtland demonstration into some 
perspective, the average (adjusted) 30 per cent enhanced hazard rate 
corresponds to a similar drop in the average unemployment duration in the pre-
programme period. With an average pre-programme UI spell of 22 days in the 
control group, this translates into a 6.5 UI-day drop (10.1 and 2.8 UI days for 
the JSA and the no-JSA services respectively) in the pre-programme period. 
With an average daily compensation of SEK 626, the reduction of the UI spell 
in the pre-programme period saves SEK 2 million in UI benefits. Since the 
demonstration’s total expenditures were SEK 2.5 million, the savings covered 




















19 Table 5 Number of weeks as openly unemployed or as participant in a programme in 
the 26-week period that follows after exit from unemployment. 

























        
90  25.4 25.4 25.6 24.3 25.2 25.0 23.6 25.0 
75  20.9 20.6 21.1 18.1 19.8 17.8 18.2 18.7 
50  9.8 8.1  10.8  9.0 8.5 8.0  12.0  10.2 
25  0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 2.0 
10  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
           
Average no. of 
unemployed 
weeks 
11.3 10.8 11.9 10.3 10.5 10.2  11.2 11.1 
Whereof as in:  
        
-open 
unemployment 
9.6 9.2  10.1 9.0 9.4 9.3 8.9 9.0 
 -programme  





control group in 



















observations  231 128 103 192  90  81  93  94 
Note: 





This paper has investigated the significance of pre-programme effects of being 
referred to active placement measures among UI receivers in Sweden. Using 
experimental data from three separate demonstration programmes in different 
regions in 2004, disruptions of the UI spell in the interval between notification 
of the programme and programme start were compared between the experiment 
and control groups. The results are mixed. In one of the experiments, the 
Jämtland demonstration, the hazard rate preceding a combination of treatment 
including job-search assistance activities and increased job-search monitoring, 
increased by 46 per cent. This translates into a two-week reduction of the 
ongoing unemployment spell. The findings support previous research 
suggesting that the response to the “disutility” involved in complying with 
activation requirements could be substantial. By offering two different 
treatment packages in the demonstration, with random assignment to each 
treatment, I conclude that the positive effect derives from the referrals to the 
job-search assistance activities. The effect of referrals to recurrent interviews 
monitoring the job search is significantly lower and non-significantly different 
from the exits of the control group. This finding is possibly the result of the 
job-search assistance activities being arranged in groups, which for some 
unemployed persons may be experienced as stigmatising, as opposed to the in-
person interviews. Comparison of the subsequent unemployment spells gives 
no evidence of the enhanced exit rate being the result of less attractive job 
matches, or other temporary UI disruptions. 
In the other two demonstrations, in Uppsala and in Östergötland, I find no 
evidence of any effect on the pre-programme exit rate. Because the 
demonstrations include three separately designed experiments in different parts 
of the country, a large number of factors could explain the different outcomes. 
However, considering the different motivation for the programmes and their 
different characteristics, I propose two likely explanations for the final 
outcome. First, while the Jämtland demonstration invited a broad group of UI 
receivers to participate, both the Uppsala and Östergötland demonstrations 
targeted difficult groups. These groups could on average have fewer 
opportunities to find a way out of unemployment. Also, the offered activities 
might appear relatively more attractive for them. Second, the Jämtland 
demonstration was motivated by the low job-search activity level among the 
 
 
21 unemployed. A low search effort indicates inadequate control of the UI 
requirements, which, in turn, could imply a large scope for motivation effects. 
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